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U.S. State Government Economic and Social Performance:  
Unified vs. Divided and Democrat vs. Republican Controlled State Governments 
  
 In the fifty political entities that are the American states, politicians from the two primary 
parties— the Democratic Party and the Republican Party1— compete for the right to represent 
voters as either governor or legislators. In almost all states, the elections for governor are 
conducted every four years,2 presenting voters with an opportunity to choose between alternative 
ideologies, familiar to many from federal-level politics. Sarah Morehouse suggests that the 
political party is the most important institution in state politics.3 Richard Winters agrees, noting 
“We define our candidates in party terms and our issues in party terms.”4  The party is an 
organization that endures and is known for its ideology. Candidates for elected government 
positions represent their party ideology, while sometimes adding their own flavor to it, but 
always while being defined as a “Democratic” or “Republican.” This research paper aims to shed 
light on the effect of voters’ choices on the well-being of their state.  The questions explored are 
“if and to what extent the economic and social well-being of the states are affected by the 
political structure,” i.e. the different effects of a unified or divided government, and the different 
repercussions of having different parties in control of the state government.   Philip Jones and 
John Hudson suggest that the economic advantage of political parties is to “…reduce the 
“transaction costs” of electoral participation. Political parties provide a low-cost signal of the 
candidates’ policies and personal characteristics and in this way, reduce voters’ information 
costs.”5 
 William Keech suggests that the differences between the ideologies of the parties have an 
effect on macroeconomic policies of state government.6  He agrees with Douglas Hibbs and 
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 Edward Tufte that Democrats place higher priority on low unemployment, whereas Republicans 
place higher priority on lower inflation.7 Also, empirical studies show that Democratic state 
governments spend more on welfare, enact higher minimum wage, and promote less inequality.8 
William Franko, Caroline Tolbert, and Christopher Witko report a significant difference in 
voters’ concerns relating to the two parities’ policies which influence the degree of inequality 
differently.9  It is possible for one party to win the two branches, i.e. executive and legislative, 
creating a unified government.  Alternatively, it is also possible that each party gets the majority 
of the vote for only one branch.  In this case the government is considered a divided government. 
 Political scientists disagree about the positives and negatives of a divided versus unified 
government. Christian John sums up the three reasons why a divided government is not good for 
the U.S. at the federal level.  “Divided government leads an unjustifiable weakness in 
government brought about by a lack of accountability, it produces legislative ‘gridlock,’ and it 
contributes to a diminution of the expression of popular will.”10  Will McLennan presents the 
arguments in favor of a divided government at the federal level.  “On the flip side one can argue 
that a divided government limits the size and the scope of government and fosters healthy 
competition between presidents and Congress that produces quality legislation.”11 Nicholas 
Mcintyre, Sarah Binder, and David Mayhew debate the success rates of unified versus divided 
government in their papers, based on the success rates of passing legislation at the federal 
government level. They come to the conclusion that the amount of passing legislations between 
the unified and the divided government are very similar.12   
 This paper evaluates the success of government based on their record of improving the 
state economy and increasing social well-being. This empirical analysis compares the degree of 
improvements achieved by unified and divided government, as well whether the Republicans or 
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 Democrats control the unified government.  The comparison of the degree of effectiveness of a 
unified versus a divided government is the subject of several studies.  For example, Kevin 
Leyden and Stephen Borrelli assert, “…after the election a unified government is better able to 
enact its programs.”13 James Alt and Robert Lowry agree, concluding that “…a divided 
government is less able to react to revenue shocks, which in turn leads to budget deficits 
particularly where different parties control each chamber of legislation and a unified party 
government…have a sharper reaction to negative revenue shocks.”14 Hence unified party 
legislators can pass programs that the executive branch is capable of implementing with 
minimum friction and need to compromise. However, the downside of a unified government is 
complacency, since they have absolute power. McLennan even suggests that a divided 
government might be more effective due to the competition between parties and the need to 
compromise.15 
 This empirical analysis suggests that a unified government rate of growth is not 
significantly different from a divided government, for most of the variables used to measure 
economic performance. In one variable, personal income per capita (PIC), the unified 
government is even inferior to that of a divided government. With respect to the social variables, 
the results are mixed. This study suggests that a unified government under the control of the 
Democratic Party lowers unemployment, poverty, and crime rates as compared to unified 
governments headed by the Republican Party.  This paper is divided into three sections. The first 
section shall provide definitions of the variables, the sample data, the period covered by this 
study, and the statistical model. The next section contains the regression results of our model as 
well as our analysis of the results. The last section includes the summary and the conclusions. 
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 Empirical Analysis Data, Variables, and Models 
 Panel data from forty-seven of the contiguous American states of cross-sectional 
observations and twenty-five years of time series observations ranging from 1990 to 2014 (with 
the state of Nebraska16 excluded) is the source of this study’s empirical data. With twenty-five 
years of annual observations and forty-seven cross-section observations, the model consists of a 
total sample size of 1,175 observations for each variable.17   The empirical analysis models have 
two sets of dependent variables; state economic variables and social well-being variables. 
Personal Income per Capita (PIC) is used as a proxy for state economic growth and is used in a 
per capita term rather than an aggregate term to accommodate population size.  In addition, the 
percentage of employed workers among state’s non-institutionalized population (EMP) and the 
percentage of people unemployed among the labor force (UNEMP) are dependent variables since 
job creation and unemployment are major macroeconomic issues and are widely discussed 
during national and state election campaigns.  It is interesting to note that Soledad Prillaman and 
Kenneth Meier—who study the effect of taxes and incentives on the growth of state 
economies—also used the following seven variables as proxy for economic growth: growth rate 
of real gross state product, change in employment rate, change in net job creation rate, growth 
rate of per capita personal income, change in poverty rate, change in the rate of entering business 
establishments, and change in the rate of exiting business establishments.18 
 Policies pertaining to education and training, housing subsidy, exemptions of necessities 
from being subject to sales taxes, personal exemptions from income tax, health care, and others 
are aimed specifically to lower poverty rate and to reduce income disparity.  In addition, state 
governments are involved in policies to prevent crime and make the state a safer place for its 
residents and businesses.  To evaluate the success of the state government policies in social well-
4
International Social Science Review, Vol. 94, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/issr/vol94/iss3/4
 being, the empirical analyses include state poverty rates, state inequality degree as measured by 
Gini coefficients, and the state crime rates as dependent variables.  Poverty rate (POV) is defined 
as the percentage of the state population with an income below the poverty line and crime rate 
(CR) is defined as the number of offenses per 100,000 people. The model used states Gini 
coefficients from U.S. State-Level income inequality data by Mark Frank, which constructed the 
coefficient from individual tax filing data from the Internal Revenue Service and reported the 
constriction method in his papers.19  
 As explanatory variables, the model used several political variables that reflect the 
voters’ election choices for the state government, i.e. governor and the two chambers of 
legislature.  The candidates for elected state positions, i.e. governors, senators, and members of 
the House, were identified by their party affiliation.  The two parties that almost all winning 
candidates were affiliated with are the Democratic Party and the Republican Party.20  The 
empirical analyses use four political variables: unified government, Democratic Party control of 
a unified government, Republican Party control of a unified government, and political 
competition. Those four political variables are similar to the work of Diane Rogers and John 
Rogers, Sarah Morehouse, Steven Levitt and James Poterba, and Timothy Besley, Torsten 
Persson, and Daniel Sturm but differ by the construction of the competition and the unified 
government variables.21 The unified government, abbreviated in this paper as UNIGOVT, is 
defined as the condition where the state governorship and at least 50 percent of the members in 
each of the two Houses of Congress belong to the same political party, either Democratic or 
Republican.  A unified government is a dummy variable with a value one for a unified 
government and zero for a divided government. 
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  A unified government headed by the Democratic Party will be indicated by the 
abbreviation UNIDEM, while a unified government headed by the Republican Party will be 
indicated by UNIREP. Among 1,175 observations, 46 percent of the time the states hold a 
unified government status, 22 percent of that time under Democratic control, and 24 percent of 
that time under Republican control as shown in the Data Summary Table A-2 appendix A.  
Although Besley, Persson, and Sturm measured the party’s competition as the share of votes for 
state officials excluding the governor, this empirical paper uses the seats distribution22 of the two 
parties as a proxy for the two political parties’ competition, as suggested in the 2005 working 
paper by Besley, Persson, and Sturm.23 The Political Competition, COMP, between the two 
parties in the two chambers will be quantified by the sum of products of the proportion of 
representatives from each party in the two chambers. For example, if the Senate Republican 
members represent 60 percent of the members and the House of Representatives members are 50 
percent Republican, the degree of competition is 0.4924 for that state in this election cycle.  This 
competition variable will always fall within the range of 0.0~0.50, where 0.0 represents the 
lowest degree of competition, i.e. one party controls 100 percent of both chambers of congress, 
and 0.50 represents the highest degree of competition which happens when each party has 50 
percent of the representatives in each chamber.25  Additional independent variables used as 
control variables include the percentage of population age twenty-five and older with a 
baccalaureate or higher degree, abbreviated COLLEG, the real federal aid to state per capita 
restricted to federal government expenditures for grants to state and local governments, 
abbreviated FEDAIDC, and the percentage of union membership, abbreviated UNION.  
Prillaman and Meier also include education and union as explanatory variables in their study.26  
6
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 Note that all monetary data are in real terms using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as a deflator.  
Detailed data description and sources are presented in Table 1 Appendix A.   
 All regression equations are based on robust standard error (Eicker-Huber-White) 
ordinary least square regressions with state and time fixed effect.  Our empirical model uses the 
same specification as the Besley, Persson, and Sturm’s 2010 empirical model, although their 
paper focused on the result of political competition variable while our paper focuses on the result 
of unified government, Democratic or Republican control variables.  The full regression model 
is: 
Yst = β0 + βkX
𝑘
𝑠(𝑡−1) 
+ βjZ
𝑗
𝑠𝑡 
+ αs +γt + ust , 
where s represents 47 states, t represents observation years, k represents the number of the 
politically explanatory variables, and j represents the number of control variables.  The 
explanatory variable X represents the four political variables explained above. By lagging one 
year,27 our political variables can measure the effect of those political variables on our dependent 
variables considering the time of the policies to have an effect on the economic performance or 
social variable performance. In this way, it is possible to appreciate the success of the policies 
enacted by the elected government.  The lagged variables are coded with the subscript t-1 in the 
regression models. The control variable Z represents each state education level, real per capita 
federal aid dollars transferred from the federal government, and percentages of union 
membership among employed workers. 
The variable αs captures the time invariant state fixed effect.  Each state has state specific 
economic characteristics that could affect economic performance and social well-being 
performance.  The sources of the state characteristics are coming from natural resources, 
infrastructures, types of industries, capital/labor characteristics, location, and geographic 
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 characteristics.  For example, the state of Texas has large-scale oil production that most likely 
will affect the economic performance and the industry composition, whereas the state of 
Michigan has traditionally focused on the auto industry, which makes it more vulnerable to 
national levels of economic shocks.  The state fixed-effect approach captures unobserved state 
characteristics that are assured to be fixed over time.  In order to capture time varying state fixed 
effect, the model adds the year fixed effect, γt.  State economic and social well-being 
performances are greatly influenced by national/federal level policy and the business cycle.  This 
environment does not influence the states equally.  During recessions, for example, Michigan 
state personal income and employment are typically more impacted since its industries are more 
concentrated in the luxury goods sectors,28 such as the automotive industry.  Also, the federal 
government’s fiscal policy or the Federal Reserve Bank’s monetary policy would impact states 
differently based on state economic and socio-demographic differences.  Using the time variant 
year-fixed effect, these influences would be captured so that the regression results of the 
explanatory variables are more reliable.  Since all regression models are estimated using the 
fixed effect model, eliminating αs and γt effects by using a within estimator, βs, the estimators of 
the parameters in the model are consistent estimators of the marginal effect of political variables, 
as explained by Adrian Cameron and Pravin Trivedi.29 Moreover, the estimates compute robust 
Eicker-Huber-White standard errors to have consistent and asymptotically unbiased results and 
as a robust analysis against possible issues of heteroscedasticity and non-normality. 
The tables below show the results of each group’s regression. Each dependent variable 
has two regression results with the coefficient and the p value in parentheses. The first and the 
second model are full regression models with all control variables, Yst = β0 + βk X
𝑘
𝑠(𝑡−1) 
+ βjZ
𝑗
𝑠𝑡 
+ 
αs +γt + ust , where the first model’s k contains only two political explanatory variables, 
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 UNIGOVT and COMP, while second model’s k contains the by-party political variables, 
UNIDEM, UNIREP, and COMP. 
  Analysis of the Empirical Results 
  Table 1 presents the results of running OLS fixed effect (state and time) regressions with 
economic variables as the dependent variables. The regressions reported in cols. 1, 3, and 5 help 
evaluate the performance of the state economy under a unified government in comparison to a 
divided government. Also in Table 1, the regression results reported in cols. 2, 4, and 6 help to 
test the hypothesis that a unified government controlled by the Democratic Party performs better 
(worse) than a unified government controlled by the Republican Party. The coefficient of the 
unified government variable (UNIGOVT) in col. 1 is negative and significant. This result 
suggests that a unified government’s performance is inferior to a divided government and a state 
with a unified government would have $137.28 lower state PIC.  The coefficient of the variable 
Democratic control unified government (UNIDEM) is not significant and the coefficient of a 
Republican control unified government (UNIREP) in col. 2 is significant. While the coefficient 
of the UNIDEM variable is positive the coefficient of the variable UNIREP is negative. Thus, a 
unified government controlled by the Democratic Party is more successful in at least keeping real 
personal income unchanged or improving it slightly. Whereas, a unified government controlled 
by the Republican Party is unsuccessful in raising the PIC and its state PIC is lower by $334.06. 
Note that the decline in PIC during the time when the Republicans are in control of the state 
government is much larger than the increase in PIC when Democrats are in control of the state 
government. Thus, the coefficient of the unified government variable, UNIGOVT, which is the 
combination of the two variables UNIDEM and UNIREP, is negative. The results for the two 
other economic variables, EMP and UNEMP, suggest a similar trend as observed for PIC. The 
9
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 coefficient of the variable UNIGOVT is negative in the regression with EMP as a dependent 
variable (col. 3), and positive in the regression with UNEMP as a dependent variable, but neither 
one of the two coefficients is statistically significant. In relation to the influence of the individual 
party on these two economic variables (EMP and UNEMP), the Democratic Party is successful 
in significantly lowering the unemployment rate and expanding employment rate, although not 
significantly.  Henry Chappell and William Keech cite work by Hibbs and Beck, that their 
findings for national economy “…indicated that Democratic administrations were associated 
with lower unemployment than Republican…”30  They also found that “…lower unemployment 
rates associated with Democratic victories.”31 An empirical study by Nathan Kelly and 
Christopher Witko also shows that Democratic state governments lower unemployment rate 
more than Republican state governments during economic growth.32 The influence of the 
Republican Party is in the opposite direction: it increases the unemployment rate and decreases 
the employment rate and both effects are statistically significant. 
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 Table 1: OLS Fixed Effect Regression Results for the Economic Variables, 1990-2014 
Variable 
PIC 
(Col 1) 
PIC 
(Col 2) 
EMP 
(Col 3) 
EMP 
(Col 4) 
UNEMP 
(Col 5) 
UNEMP 
(Col 6) 
UNIDEM(t-1) 
 11.42 
(0.8086) 
 0.16 
(0.1286) 
 -0.13** 
(0.0451) 
UNIREP(t-1) 
 -334.06*** 
(0.0000) 
 -0.38*** 
(0.0023) 
 0.24*** 
(0.0012) 
UNIGOVT(t-1) 
-137.28*** 
(0.0011) 
 -0.07 
(0.3815) 
 0.03 
(0.5262) 
 
COMP(t-1) 
-3463.62*** 
(0.0000) 
-3569.87*** 
(0.0000) 
-2.28** 
(0.0449) 
-2.44** 
(0.0324) 
-1.66* 
(0.0528) 
-1.55* 
(0.0685) 
COLLEGE 
43.58*** 
(0.0068) 
34.50** 
(0.0331) 
0.02 
(0.4611) 
0.01 
(0.8105) 
-0.01 
(0.7111) 
0.00 
(0.8199) 
FEDAIDC 
0.00 
(0.1029) 
0.00 
(0.3430) 
-0.00*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.00*** 
(0.0013) 
0.00 
(0.5804) 
0.00 
(0.3513) 
UNION 
83.85*** 
(0.0000) 
82.26*** 
(0.0000) 
0.09*** 
(0.0069) 
0.09*** 
(0.0084) 
-0.06*** 
(0.0054) 
-0.06*** 
(0.0063) 
_cons 
12778.14 
(0.0000) 
13024.13 
(0.0000) 
61.80 
(0.0000) 
62.18 
(0.0000) 
8.32 
(0.0000) 
8.05 
(0.0000) 
N 1128 1128 1128 1128 1128 1128 
r2 .946 .9468 .9315 .9323 .823 .8253 
t-1: 1 year lag, P values in (), *** significant at 1%, ** 5%, * 10% 
These findings are consistent with the ideology of the two parties. For example, as 
suggested by Hibbs, the Democrats favor a high growth rate and low unemployment and 
Republicans are more concerned with the risk of inflation.33 As mentioned before, the coefficient 
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 of the variable UNIGOVT has the same sign as the variable UNIREP in cols. 3 and 5. This 
occurs because the coefficients of the variable UNIREP are greater in absolute value than that of 
the variable UNIDEM in the respective regressions (cols. 4 and 6).34 The variable competition 
(COMP) has a significant coefficient in all regressions. However, it has the expected negative 
sign only in the regressions with UNEMP as dependent variable (cols. 5 and 6), i.e., to lower the 
unemployment rate. Based on our results, it will be hard to conclude that political competition, 
between the two parties in the two Houses, have a positive effect on the economy of the state, 
although Rune Sørensen’s findings suggest that “…lack of party competition reduces 
efficiency…” or alternatively “… intensive party competition improves government 
performance…”35 
The coefficient of the three non-political variables, COLLEGE, FEDAIDC, and UNION, 
are in most cases significant. Prillaman and Meier’s findings suggest that two variables, 
education and union, among others, make significant contribution to state economic 
development.36  The major exception is the FEDAIDC variable, which has an unexpected 
negative and significant coefficient in the regression with EMP as the dependent variable (cols. 3 
and 4). One possible explanation for the negative coefficient is that the better the economy of a 
state, the less money coming from the federal government. The UNION variable has in all 
regressions significant coefficients, and the sign of the coefficients suggest an increase in PIC 
and EMP, and lower UNEMP the larger the proportion of union membership. In other words, 
union policies have a positive influence on the state economic performance. Our set of 
explanatory variables, political and non-political, explain a substantial proportion of variability 
in the economic performance as measured by our three dependent variables among the forty-
seven contingent states included in our sample.  
12
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   State Social Performance 
A summary of the regression results with the three social variables as dependent variables are 
reported in Table 2. The three dependent variables are poverty rate (POV) cols. 1 and 2, 
distribution of income—Gini coefficient (GINI) cols 3 and 4, and crime rate (CR) cols. 5 and 6.  
The unified government variable, UNIGOVT, has a significant coefficient in two of the three 
regressions, cols. 3 and 5. In col. 1, the regression with POV as the dependent variable, the 
coefficient is negative but insignificant. Reviewing the results in col. 2, where one can 
distinguish between a unified government by the party in control, reveals that the coefficient for 
the UNIDEM variable is negative, lowering the poverty rate, whereas the coefficient for 
UNIREP is positive, increasing the poverty rate. It is consistent with Kelly and Witko’s 
argument that when Democrats gain power, their presence becomes a power resource for the 
poor.37 For both variables, their coefficients are weakly significant (10 percent) and almost of the 
same magnitude with a value -0.24 and 0.25, respectively. Thus, it seems reasonable to suggest 
that the coefficient of the combined variable, UNIGOVT, will be close to zero (-0.03) and 
insignificant as we find in Table 2, Col 1. 
 The effect of the variable Democratic control government, UNIDEM, on the Gini 
coefficient variable is positive, but the coefficient is statistically insignificant. Our variable 
UNIDEM can be considered as proxy to the Charles Barrilleaux and Davis variable ‘Lower Class 
Turnout.’38 When examining voting behavior during the 2008 election by income group, Kelly 
and Witko note “…44 percent of the high income group and 85 percent of the low income group 
reporting voting for Obama (Democrat).”39 The effect of the variable Republican control 
government, UNIREP, on the Gini coefficient variable is also positive but significant. These 
13
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 results suggest that the policies enacted by a unified government under the control of the 
Republican Party leads to an increase in inequality in the distribution of income. 
 
Table 2: OLS Fixed Effect Regression Results for the Social Variables, 1990-2014 
Variable 
POV 
(col 1) 
POV 
(Col 2) 
GINI 
(Col 3) 
GINI 
(Col 4) 
CR 
(Col 5) 
CR 
(Col 6) 
UNIDEM(t-1)  
-0.24 * 
(0.0834) 
 
0.00 
(0.4962) 
 
-123.82*** 
(0.0001) 
UNIREP(t-1)  
0.25* 
(0.0904) 
 
0.01*** 
(0.0002) 
 
-43.56 
(0.2773) 
UNIGOVT(t-1) 
-0.03 
(0.7975) 
 
0.00** 
(0.0116) 
 
-89.27*** 
(0.0010) 
 
COMP(t-1) 
-5.50*** 
(0.0006) 
-5.35*** 
(0.0009) 
0.05*** 
(0.0001) 
0.06*** 
(0.0001) 
713.76* 
(0.0809) 
738.44* 
(0.0724) 
COLLEGE 
-0.11*** 
(0.0039) 
-0.10** 
(0.0116) 
-0.00*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.00*** 
(0.0018) 
5.04 
(0.5738) 
7.15 
(0.4199) 
FEDAIDC 
0.00*** 
(0.0000) 
0.00*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.00*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.00*** 
(0.0028) 
0.01*** 
(0.0000) 
0.01*** 
(0.0000) 
UNION 
-0.16*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.16*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.00** 
(0.0248) 
-0.00** 
(0.0257) 
-21.93* 
(0.0566) 
-21.56* 
(0.0610) 
_cons 
20.92 
(0.0000) 
20.56 
(0.0000) 
0.58 
(0.0000) 
0.58 
(0.0000) 
5160.20 
(0.0000) 
5103.06 
(0.0000) 
N 1128 1128 1081 1081 1128 1128 
r2 0.8289 0.83 0.8144 0.8152 0.8972 0.8974 
t-1: 1 year lag, P values in (), *** significant at 1%, ** 5%, * 10% 
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 The combined unified government variable, UNIGOVT, is positive and significant, which is 
similar to the effect of the UNIREP variable. Barrilleaux and Davis findings are similar to these 
findings. The coefficient of their variable ‘Lower Class Turnout’ is positive and “a 1 percent 
increase in lower income voter turnout produces a one tenth of 1 percent increase in the Gini 
measure.”40  The coefficients of the variables UNIDEM and UNIREP in col. 6 are both negative 
but only the coefficient of the UNIDEM is significant. Thus, policies chosen by a unified 
government controlled by the Democrats are leading to a significant reduction in the crime rate. 
A similar result is observed at the aggregate level where the coefficient of the UNIGOVT 
variable (col. 5) is negative and significant. Apparently, the two parties in this case are 
responsible for the decline in crime rate with the Democrats being more effective.  The 
competition variable, COMP, has a significant coefficient in four out of the six regressions and 
in the other two, it is weakly significant. More political competition between the two parties 
helps states to lower the poverty rate. However, at the same time, more competition shows an 
increase in the degree of inequality and shows an increase in crime rate.   
 The proportion of the population with a college degree variable (COLLEGE) has a 
negative and significant coefficient in the regressions with POV and GINI as dependent 
variables. These results are to be expected since more education is positively associated with 
higher income, which in turns helps to lower the poverty rate and makes the distribution of 
income more equal. Unexpectedly, the coefficients of the COLLEGE variable are positive 
although insignificant in the regressions with CR as the dependent variable (cols. 5 and 6). The 
contribution of the variable FEDAIDC is significant in all the regressions. The direction of the 
effect is to lower the inequality level, and to increase the poverty and crime rates. It is possible 
that the positive coefficient of the FEDAIDC variable suggests a reversed effect, i.e., the higher 
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 the state rate of poverty and crime, the more federal funds are becoming available. However, the 
magnitude of the coefficients is almost zero, showing not much practical importance in these 
social variables.   The variable UNION, the proportion of the labor force who are union 
members, also makes a significant contribution in all the regressions except the regressions with 
crime rate as a dependent variable (cols. 5 and 6), where it is only weakly significant. The 
direction of the effect is always negative, i.e., lowering the poverty rate, lower the level of 
inequality in distribution of income and lower the crime rate. It suggests that states with higher 
proportions of union membership achieve the social goal of lowering poverty rate, decreasing 
income inequality, and lowering the crime rate. Kelly and Witko suggest that higher union 
membership lower income inequality and “vehicle through which markets can be pushed in a 
more egalitarian direction.”41  In all regressions, our set of independent variables, political and 
non-political, explain over 80 percent of the variability in the dependent variables. 
      Conclusion 
   This study aims to answer the two questions: is a unified government’s performance 
superior to a divided government’s performance and is the performance of a unified government 
controlled by the Democratic Party superior (inferior) to the performance of a unified 
government under the control of the Republican Party. The evaluation of the performance of the 
government was done using two groups of variables. Group one contains three economic 
variables and group two contains three social variables. The empirical analysis leads us to the 
conclusion that in states with a unified government the performance in the economic area is 
inferior to the performance of states with a divided government. This conclusion is derived from 
the regression results shown in Table 1, which demonstrates that unified governments lowered 
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 PIC and EMP and increased unemployment. However, a more careful review of the results raises 
the possibility of more complicated relationships. 
 Unified governments’ performance under the control of the Democratic Party in the 
economic area is superior to the performance of a unified government under the control of the 
Republican Party. This is especially true regarding the variable, UNEMP, which has negative 
coefficients and is significant. Thus, states with Democratic unified governments are more 
successful in expanding their economy, i.e. lowering unemployment rate and, to a lesser degree, 
increasing the number of jobs. Republican controlled unified governments failed to state 
economic growth. In fact, real per capita personal income, as well as employment per capita both 
fell significantly whereas the unemployment rate rose significantly. The magnitude of the effect 
a unified Republican government has on growth rate of the economic variables is larger, in 
absolute value, than the effect of a Democratic unified controlled government. Therefore, the 
combined effect of a unified government, regardless of the party, has the same direction as a 
unified Republican party (a negative one). That unified governments do not do as well as or 
better than divided governments in terms of economic growth can be attributed to the Republican 
Party. 
 In the social area, findings suggest that unified governments are more successful in 
lowering the poverty rate42 and the crime rate, but also increase the inequality in the distribution 
of income. Again, the breakdown of the variable UNIGOVT by party control reveals some 
important differences in the performance of states by party control. Unified governments 
controlled by the Democratic Party lower the poverty rate and the crime rate and have no effect 
on the GINI coefficient. On the other hand, a unified government controlled by the Republican 
party pushes up the poverty rate and the degree of inequality in the distribution of income and of 
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 lowering the crime rate, although not significantly.  The sign of the variable political competition 
suggests that more competition, i.e. closer election results for the two Houses, the lower the 
poverty rate and increase the Gini coefficient (more inequality) and crime rate. Among non-
political variables, all three of them lower the degree of inequality in the distribution of income 
in a statistically significant way. Also, two variables, COLLEGE and UNION, lower the poverty 
rate, and UNION also helps to lower the crime rate.  Kelly and Witko found that Democrats in 
power lower poverty and the degree of inequality.43  Unions have similar effect. 
 The empirical results presented in this paper lead to some general conclusions. The 
performances of unified and divided governments are different in some areas and variables, but 
not in all. A general evaluation of the performance of one type of government in comparison to 
the other is impossible. Such comparison needs to be done for every area, and with respect to the 
individual variables. Moreover, and not less important than the distinction between a unified and 
a divided government, is the identification of which party is in control of the unified government. 
There are important differences in performance between the two parties. These differences are 
not only in the magnitude of the effect, but also in the direction (qualitative and quantitative).  
Thus, the voters, who have their own set of goals, need to be aware of which party is serving 
their priorities more effectively. 
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 Appendix A 
Table 1: Data Description and Sources 
Variable Detail 
Personal income per capita 
 
Real Personal Income per 
Capita (PIC) 
Per capita personal income is total personal income divided by total midyear 
population from BEA 
Personal Income per capita/consumer price index(CPI). CPI from BLS 
Employment rate (EMP) Percent of people employed among non-institutionalized civilian population 
from BLS data base States and selected areas:  Employment status of the 
civilian non-institutional population 
Unemployment rate 
(UNEMP) 
Percent of people employed among labor force from BLS data base States and 
selected areas:  Employment status of the civilian non-institutional population 
Poverty rate (POV) Number of people in poverty as Percentage of population 
From Census Bureau, Historical Poverty Tables: People and Families - 1959 to 
2014: table 21 
Crime Rate (CR) Total offenses (violent and property crime) per 100,000 
1990 – 2012 U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics(UCR) 
2013-2014 FBI: UCR Crime in the United States by State 
Gini Index (GINI) Index from U.S. State-Level Income Inequality Data - Mark W. Frank 
College graduation rate 
(COLLEGE) 
Percent of Persons 25 Years and Over Who Have Completed a Bachelor's 
Degree," and "Percent of Persons 25 Years and Over Who Have Completed an 
Advanced Degree from Census Educational Attainment by State and 
Educational Attainment in the United States Detailed Tables 
Union rate (UNION) Percentage of employed people who have a union membership from Union 
Membership and Coverage Database. The Database, constructed by Barry 
Hirsch (Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University) 
and David Macpherson (Department of Economics, Trinity University), was 
created in 2002 and is updated annually. 
Federal aid per capita 
(FEDAIDC) 
Federal Government aid to state and local governments by state from Census. 
2014 data is from USA Spending.gov. 
Political competition and 
Governor (COMP) 
State Legislature Composition from The Council of the State Knowledge 
Center’s Book of States, Chapter 3 for 2012-2014 and Table 419. Composition 
of State Legislatures, by Political Party Affiliation for the last of the years 
Governor’s Party Affiliation from National Governor’s Association 
organization. 
Unified government 
(UNIGOVT) 
The same political party has control of Governor, upper and lower houses. 
Democratic Control 
(UNIDEM) 
Democratic Party Governor, Democratic party has more than 50% seat control 
of upper and lower houses 
Republican control 
(UNIREP) 
Republican Party Governor, Republican party has more than 50% seat control 
of upper and lower houses 
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 Table 2: Data Summary Table 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Personal income per capita 1175 31132.45 9601.766 13288 64864 
Employment rate 1175 62.80698 4.53151 48.8 73 
Unemployment rate 1175 5.737362 1.861922 2.3 13.7 
Poverty rate 1175 12.94672 3.637038 4.5 26.4 
Crime rate 1175 4045.409 1239.796 1623.7 8810.8 
Gini Index 1128 .5851267 0.0354897 0.5213105 .7114252 
College graduation rate 1175 24.87557 5.291345 11.4 40 
Union rate 1175 11.92077 5.552328 1.9 29.4 
Federal aid per capita 1175 2653.965 4223.318 4.2 136034.2 
Political competition 1175 0.4435915 0.0663096 0.165 0.5 
Unified government 1175 0.46297 0.4988399 0 1 
Democratic control 1175 0.2212766 0.4152831 0 1 
Republican control 1175 0.2417021 0.428297 0 1 
 
Table 3: Mean & Standard Deviation by Government Status and Party Control 
Variables 
Unified Gov’t 
(Obs: 544) 
Divided Gov’t 
(Obs:631) 
UNI DEM 
(Obs:260) 
UNI REP 
(Obs:284) 
Personal income per capita $16,186 (2949.04) $16,445 (2857.95) $16,309 (3629.88) $16,073 (2145.13) 
Employment rate 62.4% (5.04) 63.2% (4.02) 60.9% (4.71) 63.79% (4.95) 
Unemployment rate 5.81% (1.88) 5.68% (1.84) 6.28% (1.74) 5.38% (1.91) 
Poverty rate 13.3% (3.83) 12.65% (3.43) 13.96% (4.14) 12.69% (3.43) 
Crime rate (per 100,000) 3861 (1217.73) 4204.7 (1237.5) 3988.18 (1278.3) 3743.9 (1149.4) 
Gini Index 0.587 (0.036) 0.583 (0.035) 0.581 (0.036) 0.593 (0.036) 
  
20
International Social Science Review, Vol. 94, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/issr/vol94/iss3/4
 Table 4: OLS Fixed Effect Regression Results for the Economic Variables, 1990-2014, Two Periods Lag   
Variable PIC PIC EMP EMP UNEMP UNEMP 
UNIDEM(t-2) -14.19 
(0.7747) 
 0.10 
(0.3342) 
 -0.09 
(0.1827) 
 
UNIREP(t-2) -320.22*** 
(0.0000) 
 -0.38*** 
(0.0023) 
 0.21*** 
(0.0061) 
 
UNIGOVT(t-2)  -146.75*** 
(0.0006) 
 -0.11 
(0.2010) 
 0.04 
(0.4706) 
COMP(t-2) -3057.31*** 
(0.0000) 
-2967.12*** 
(0.0000) 
-1.77 
(0.1471) 
-1.63 
(0.1793) 
-2.02** 
(0.0171) 
-2.10** 
(0.0137) 
COLLEGE 42.51** 
(0.0143) 
50.37*** 
(0.0033) 
0.02 
(0.4391) 
0.03 
(0.2250) 
0.01 
(0.6014) 
0.00 
(0.9382) 
FEDAID 0.00*** 
(0.0041) 
0.00*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.00*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.00*** 
(0.0007) 
0.00 
(0.7112) 
-0.00 
(0.9893) 
UNION 87.30*** 
(0.0000) 
86.85*** 
(0.0000) 
0.11*** 
(0.0016) 
0.11*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.08*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.08*** 
(0.0008) 
_cons 12844.80 
(0.0000) 
12659.97 
(0.0000) 
61.30 
(0.0000) 
61.01 
(0.0000) 
8.73 
(0.0000) 
8.91 
(0.0000) 
N 1081 1081 1081 1081 1081 1081 
r2 .9446 .9439 .9338 .9332 .8312 .8298 
t-2: 2 year lag, P values in (), *** significant at 1%, ** 5%, * 10% 
Table 5: OLS Fixed Effect Regression Results for the Social Variables, 1990-2014, Two Periods Lag   
Variable 
POV 
(col 1) 
POV 
(Col 2) 
GINI 
(Col 3) 
GINI 
(Col 4) 
CR 
(Col 5) 
CR 
(Col 6) 
UNIDEM(t-2) -0.01 
(0.9325) 
 -86.22*** 
(0.0062) 
 0.00 
(0.6075) 
 
UNIREP(t-2) 0.43*** 
(0.0039) 
 -41.64 
(0.3074) 
 0.01*** 
(0.0000) 
 
UNIGOVT(t-2)  0.18 
(0.1030) 
 -66.91** 
(0.0129) 
 0.00** 
(0.0103) 
COMP(t-2) -6.02*** 
(0.0008) 
-6.15*** 
(0.0006) 
729.77* 
(0.0955) 
716.60* 
(0.1004) 
0.06*** 
(0.0001) 
0.06*** 
(0.0001) 
COLLEGE -0.11** 
(0.0110) 
-0.12*** 
(0.0040) 
8.83 
(0.3288) 
7.69 
(0.4002) 
-0.00*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.00*** 
(0.0002) 
FEDAID 0.00*** 
(0.0000) 
0.00*** 
(0.0000) 
0.01*** 
(0.0000) 
0.01*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.00*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.00*** 
(0.0001) 
UNION -0.18*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.18*** 
(0.0001) 
-15.10 
(0.1843) 
-15.03 
(0.1853) 
-0.00** 
(0.0376) 
-0.00** 
(0.0428) 
_cons 21.52*** 
(0.0000) 
21.79*** 
(0.0000) 
4767.53*** 
(0.0000) 
4794.46*** 
(0.0000) 
0.63*** 
(0.0000) 
0.63*** 
(0.0000) 
N 1081 1081 1081 1081 1034 1034 
r2 .8303 .8294 .9004 .9003 .8145 .8133 
t-2: 2 year lag, P values in (), *** significant at 1%, ** 5%, * 10%  
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